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Border politics are a salient component of high international politics. States are increasingly building 
infrastructure to ‘secure’ their borders. We introduce the concept of border orientation to describe the extent to 
which the State is committed to the spatial display of capacities to control the terms of penetration of its 
national borders. Border orientation provides a lens through which to analyze resistance to globalization, 
growing populism, and the consequences of intensified border politics. We measure border orientation using 
novel, geo-spatial data on the built environment along the world’s borders and theorize that real and perceived 
pressures of globalization have resulted in more controlling forms of border governance. Empirical evidence 
supports this claim: states build more along their borders when faced with economic, cultural, and security-
based anxieties. Border orientation enhances the study of border politics, complementing the politics of 
territorial division with a richer politics of liminal securitization and its consequences. 
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 1 
Borders are an increasingly salient component of national and international politics. States 
have historically fought bloody battles to establish their authority over space; for this reason, territorial 
conflicts are commonly cited as one of the most important causes of war (Senese and Vasquez 2008). 
Fairly recently, however, states’ authoritative peacetime border displays have become increasingly 
controversial. Globalization of markets and intensified human mobility increasingly challenge political 
authority and raise questions of cultural identity. Possibly in response to intensifying global pressures, 
some states employ highly visible strategies of territorial legitimation (Brown 2010) by asserting their 
control over physical space. In some cases, border control has become a central policy lever in 
response to a range of perceived external state and non-state threats.  
 Scholars have few organizing conceptual frameworks to systematize the study of territorial 
authority in the modern era. The most advanced research program centers on territorial claims, where 
states compete over border location (Schultz 2015, Allee and Huth 2006). The continued pursuit of 
this research agenda is vital to our understanding of territorial politics but leaves aside many salient 
issues that persist even when a border is settled. We propose a paradigm-shifting focus to the question 
of governance along international borders (Longo 2017b, Simmons 2019). Making this shift requires an 
organizing conceptual framework for ascribing meaning to expressions of state authority at the border. 
We therefore introduce a new concept we label border orientation, which taps the State’s commitment 
to the public, authoritative, and spatial display of its capacities to control the terms of penetration of 
its national borders, often in response to perceived vulnerabilities to external “threats” from state and 
non-state forces. 
Though a state’s border orientation cannot be observed directly, it can be approximately 
inferred by major physical investments at the border. These spatialized investments reflect how states 





signaling their commitment to rule spatially.1 The built environment represents a concrete effort – 
functional and symbolic – to control the terms of entry into, and potentially exit from, a national 
jurisdiction. These features constitute perimeter and access systems that can be analyzed as expressions 
of state authority. International borders, like other political spaces, are governed using infrastructure, 
which routinize how information and commands are transmitted by the State. The built environment 
is therefore an especially important cue for understanding a state’s border orientation.   
Border orientation is important to the study of politics because borders are fundamental 
institutions of governance. Indeed, borders are “meta-rules,” in the sense that they define the space 
over which other rules and policies apply. Internationally, they constitute the units of the state system. 
Domestically, a state’s border presence attempts to assure citizens of the State’s ability to supply 
security, to make and enforce rules, and to deliver or deny services. These aspects of spatial governance 
speak to the very legitimacy of the territorial state itself.  
Border orientation can be documented empirically on a global scale.  Using new data on border 
crossings, border barriers, and border-zone law enforcement stations, we construct and validate a 
hierarchical latent variable model that generates estimates of border orientation along a 
unidimensional scale corresponding to permissive border orientations, where little infrastructure is built, 
to controlling orientations where the presence of filtering infrastructure is intense. Using this concept 
of border orientation, scholars of comparative and international politics will be able to assess an 
important spatial aspect of governance. 
Our empirical analyses confirm conventional wisdom and suggest new insights. Recent 
decades have witnessed heightened commitments to border security. Most intriguingly, our findings 
suggest cultural, economic, and security fears are robustly associated with more controlling 
 
1 Here we are concerned with conceptually defining and measuring border orientation; we leave to future research the 





orientations.  We also find strong links between controlling orientations and the recent surge in 
populism experienced by many countries. Border orientation is a useful lens through which to explore 
a range of national anxieties, aspirations, and capacities and to interrogate spatialized governance in 
the context of globalization. 
I. International Borders and State Authority 
Borders and legitimate governance 
The establishment of international borders has always been a foundational aspect of modern 
state legitimacy (Herz 1957). It is difficult to conceive of the territorial state without theorizing its 
borders as technologies to help legitimate its right to govern space. Territorial delineation, nation-
statehood, and the formation of the modern state system were largely co-constitutive processes 
(Sahlins 1989, Atzili and Kadercan 2017). Indeed, territorial boundedness has become part of the 
definition of what it means to be a nation-state. Territorial integrity now constitutes a core norm of 
international relations (Zacher 2001). 
For modern states, the international border is the ultimate symbol of sovereignty (Baud and 
Van Schendel 1997, 226). It defines the space over which states claim the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force (Weber 1919) and in which they legitimately make, administer, and 
execute law (Baudet 2012, 32). Moral claims to territory, at least in liberal theory, rest on the legitimate 
right to govern (Buchanan and Moore 2003, 6). In his sweeping historical account of borders, Maier 
(2016, 78) writes that “Sovereignty, ownership, and morality came with the territory literally and 
figuratively."  
Unsurprisingly then, threats to border control are understood by some state officials and 
domestic groups as threats to the state itself.  Similarly, national borders are likely to be viewed by 





way of life. A “borderless world” (Ohmae 1990) worries nationalists of many stripes. Economic 
integration and technological innovation have contributed to the sense that state boundaries are of 
vanishing relevance. Transnational threats – from insurgencies to terrorism to cyber threats – are said 
to have “de-bordered” national security in new ways (Goodman and Portnoy 2009). National security 
threat assessments in the 1990s for the first time began to place transnational organized crime near 
the top of the list.2 The metaphor of a networked world displaced that of a territorialized and politically 
bordered one (Castells 2000) – a shift that has not universally been experienced as positive Indeed, in 
some countries these developments are viewed as a conspiracy of elites corruptly dodging investments 
at home. 
Human mobility in particular is increasingly interpreted as a source of threat to ontological 
security, or a stable sense of national, group or individual identity (Mitzen 2006), People living in 
countries other than that of their birth constitute between 3 and 3.25% of the world’s population.3  
About 25.4 million people were forced to flee their countries and live abroad as refugees in 2017; 
another 3.1 million presented themselves at foreign borders as official asylum seekers.4 Borderlands 
have (re)emerged as the epicenter of national identity politics (Wilson and Donnan 1998). 
We do not contend that these trends “cause” human insecurity. We make the lesser 
assumption that they are plausibly experienced as such by some groups in some states.5 Moreover,  
threats blur and merge, so that it is unproductive to distinguish traditional issue categories: in the 
 
2 In 1995, Presidential Decision Directive-42 (PDD-42), created by President Clinton, recognized Global Organized 
Crime as a threat to national security. Available at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-42.pdf.  
3 United Nations (UN), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf. 
(Accessed 5 August 2018.) 
4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/statistics/unhcrstats/5b27be547/unhcr-global-trends-2017.html. (Accessed 5 August 2018.) 
5 A rich literature has developed over the past two decades exploring how territorial states battle transnational forces 
they cannot easily control. That literature describes new forms of bordering (Sassen 2008), “invisible” borders (Goff 





popular imagination, terrorism merges with migration, security with deindustrializing trade 
competition, rebel threats with foreign interventions. Since states’ legitimacy is based on their 
territorial claim to rule, they have good reasons to meet a wide range of external governance challenges 
with visible border policies. This is understandable, since international borders are among the most 
globally recognized and revered institutions of any in human social relations (Diener 2012). There is 
no clearer response to the global governance challenges to the modern nation-state than to invest in 
visible symbols, structures and practices that signal state control at the border. Such investments are 
deeply bound up with the project of legitimating the state itself, even in parts of the world where 
effective control is illusive (Chalfin 2010). One implication of this theory of the territorial state is that 
symbolic as well as functional strategies will increase alongside processes of globalization (Rudolph 
2005, Brown 2010). Yet, political science lacks a conceptual and analytic framework for understanding, 
let alone measuring, these challenges to territorial governance.  
The Concept of Border Orientation 
Our purpose is to introduce such a framework, and to demonstrate that it can be meaningfully 
conceptualized and measured. We suggest the notion of “border orientation,” defined as the extent to 
which the State is committed to the public, authoritative, and spatial display of control over territorial entry and exit at 
its national borders. A state’s border orientation can range from relatively permissive to controlling. 
Permissiveness is characterized by a willingness to allow the movement of goods and people to 
proceed across borders unchecked. Controlling orientations, by contrast, seek to project filtering 
capacity, even while simultaneously facilitating desired transnational trade or human movement. Such 






Border orientation encodes the methods, practices and styles of establishing state authority in 
territorial space. Our use of the word “orientation” is analogous to a firm’s unobservable 
“entrepreneurial orientation” which comprises such observable indicators as its research and 
development expenditures, debt, and competitive aggressiveness (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). “Goal 
orientation” is used in personality and achievement studies, where it is understood as a “disposition 
toward developing or validating one's ability in achievement settings” (VandeWalle 1997) as gleaned 
from subjects’ responses to validated personality instruments. An even closer analogy from political 
science is Caughey and Warshaw’s (2016) “overall orientation of state policy” which makes use of 43 
indicators of “policy liberalism” to characterize the ideological orientation of the fifty United States. 
The concept of “orientation” is used in many contexts to denote the positioning of someone or 
something in relationship to their surroundings, and may encapsulate essential features of both 
individuals (Fromm 2013) and organizations (Hurley and Hult 1998). 
Organizational orientations raise the issue of where these underlying characteristics come from 
and at what level of analysis they are generated. Just as the literature on entrepreneurial orientation 
does not attribute it to the individual CEO (Lumpkin and Dess 1996), border orientation typically is 
not the product of a single leader. It arises from the interplay of societal preferences and domestic 
institutions that aggregate and propagate actionable values more generally. In liberal polities, border 
orientation is the product of civil society preferences as refracted through representative institutions. 
In autocratic states, border orientation can emerge from the preferences of a smaller ruling elite and 
can actively repress civil society, as the Berlin Wall exemplified. We refer to a state’s border orientation 






Border orientation is a compound concept that combines the intensity of authoritative display 
and the location where it is exercised. Theories of spatial governance emphasize the location of 
infrastructure as a strategic choice with consequences for internal consolidation and development 
(Boone 2003, Steinberg 2017). Border governance requires a similar treatment in the face of external 
pressures from globalization. Infrastructures of border control may be justified as protection from 
unwanted foreign influence, culture, ideologies, violence, disease or other “dangers.” State control 
may also be positively justified as essential to public goods provision, from the rule of law to 
comprehensive public welfare. Importantly, “controlling” orientations typically do not seek to block 
all cross-border flows. Rather they signal an anxious domestic audience as well as an audacious 
international one that The State will determine who and what enters, and on what terms; in other 
words, the authority to filter. 
The spatial character of this authority is central to our concept. We are interested in describing 
a phenomenon that potentially reinforces, possibly even reifies, the political boundary of the state. 
The international border is arguably one of the most legitimate locations for such display. Filtering 
unwanted foreign goods and people can certainly be exercised internally, but it is often criticized as an 
encroachment on civil liberties. It can also take place extraterritorially – in foreign airports, at sea, even 
on the sovereign territory of other states – but at the cost of accusations of imperialism and coercion 
(Longo 2017a). International law and norms support the common conception that every state has the 
right to “defend its borders” at the border. To do so is nearly synonymous with making existential 
legitimacy claims.  
The concept of border orientation also includes an aspect of “logistical power” – a form of 
power that derives from shaping and controlling the physical world (Mukerji 2010). The ability to filter 





increasingly territorializing means” (Martin 2012). We conceptualize physical border structures as a 
means to display and exercise political authority. 
We define border orientation along a single dimension based on filtering of entry and exit to 
and from the national territory, whether aimed at the entry of armies, products, migrants, or violence. 
Moreover, border orientation is typically sticky over time. While political rhetoric or policy fluctuations 
may change in response to emergencies or sudden shifts in political pressure, a commitment to state 
presence at the border often requires the development, deployment and maintenance of significant 
resources and is typically observed over years, rather than days. Investments often accumulate with 
time, but they also deteriorate and are sometimes purposefully dismantled, as were many of the border 
controls in what is now the Schengen area. 
Border orientation can be conceptualized at multiple levels, the highest of which reflects a 
state’s national orientation toward its set of neighbors. Some states seek to project more control over 
borders with particular neighbors; for example, United States arguably goes to greater lengths to 
display control along its southern border than it does in the north; in coordination with other 
Schengen countries, Poland displays much more state authority along its eastern border with Belarus 
and Ukraine than the border with Germany to the west. Border orientation may also vary locally along 
a single border. Some states that are highly committed to projecting border authority generally may 
have exceptional crossings where state presence is low (Big Bend National Park where Texas borders 
Mexico is an example).6 Some borders, such as northern Chile and southern Peru have well-appointed 
border crossings (e.g., that at Tacna and Arica) but no off-road fencing at all, rendering ambulatory 
evasion simple.7 The higher a state’s overall orientation, however, the rarer such variance will be. Just 
as the ideology of a political official can be thought of as the proportion of “left” or “right”  votes 
 
6 Site visit, June 2017. 





they cast – i.e., a congressional DW nominate score (Poole and Rosenthal 2000) – border orientation 
can be thought of as the proportion of a state’s border or borders where it seeks to project its presence. 
In short, while border orientation can be conceptualized as a general characteristic of a state, it also 
has a dyadic, and even a local component.  
Authoritative display is not inherently utilitarian. It often has a symbolic element. Flying a 
national flag over a port of entry is an obvious example. Border walls and fences too are often symbolic 
rather than strictly functional (Brown 2010). For whom is the display intended? It may be directed 
primarily to foreign audiences, signaling welcome, efficiency, or a determination to deter. Or the 
display may primarily be intended to signal protection or competence to a domestic audience. Such 
displays often have a Janus-faced quality, communicating to internal and external audiences 
simultaneously. Importantly, we focus on displays, but are agnostic about their effectiveness.  
Strictly speaking, border orientation is not a measure of whether a border is open or closed to 
transnational traffic. A controlling border orientation is fully consistent with a liberal trade regime for 
licit goods (e.g., NAFTA liberalizes trade while the US tightly controls its southern border.) Nor do 
we consider covert filtering technologies such as invisible sensors or landmines to constitute public 
display. States sometimes outsource border management to non-state actors, from private security 
firms to the volunteer sector to international organizations, but here our focus is on public bordering 
expressions by the state’s central government and/or its official agents.  
A state’s border orientation is latent – it cannot be observed directly. The best proxies are 
fundamental authoritative investments at and near the border, which are crucial visual indicators of a 
state’s commitment to border control. We recognize the built environment is not a perfect indication 
of orientation. Resource constraints may lead to underestimation, since it is possible states might 





less need to display authority on mountainous borders that few will observe or attempt to penetrate. 
Nonetheless, fundamental authoritative investments are a useful indicator of a state’s orientation 
toward controlling territorial entry and possibly exit. 
Figure 1 presents border orientation along a unidimensional spectrum. At one end states 
demonstrate little control over their borders – perhaps only delimiting and demarcating them. In the 
extreme, it is hard to determine the existence of an international border on the ground at all. We 
describe this orientation as “permissive” in the sense that few attempts are made to visibly display 
control or filter movement at the border. The opposite is true at the other extreme, where orientation 
is highly controlling. These states make great investments to demonstrate control over their borders, 
which are often marked with walls, fences, and other physical structures. The claim is not that such 
efforts represent a closed border or exist to stifle movement; rather this end of the spectrum displays 
the authority to enforce border filtering. 
II. Data: Collecting Information on the Built Environment at the Borders 
To explore border orientation, we have created an innovative dataset of observable physical 
investments at the border. These are of three kinds: architecture at each land port of entry, 
infrastructure built along each side of a territorial land border including every wall or substantial fence 
built parallel and proximate to the border, and the relative density of police stations in the border zone 
(Table 1).  
Access Points: Border Crossings 
Border crossings are the spaces where states may implement a mix of policies, structures and 
symbols that connect and separate, that facilitate exit and entry selectively. To identify border crossings, 





contiguous countries.8  We overlaid this highway database on a political map of the world to isolate 
intersections (border crossings) before validating visually.9 These crossings generally reflect places 
where motorized vehicle can cross the border, usually with at least one paved lane each way.  If a road 
approaches but does not cross the border it is deleted as a false positive. For each border crossing, 
visual inspections using both high altitude and street view images were made to characterize the built 
environment on each side per Table 1, distinguishing State A and State B.   
While Appendix D (pg. 12-15) gives the criteria in detail, Figure 2 depicts two extreme 
examples. The United States has invested tremendously in symbols and capacity to filter activities at 
many of its border crossings with Mexico. Inspection stations, barriers, and buildings are all arrayed 
to improve the chances of filtering in this space. Parts of Africa provide a stark contrast, as shown by 
a remote border crossing between Burkina Faso and Togo. Importantly, we do not assert that we can 
tell exactly the nature of the threat states intend to disrupt through these efforts. However, we do infer 
an intent to signal the authority and capacity to control a border configured as shown in Figure 2a. 
Based on these criteria, we produced a dataset of 828 total border crossings with 20 yearly 
observations. The visual corpus from which Figure 2 is drawn is massive but limited in important 
ways. Satellite images are generated in response to demand, so some parts of the world have clearer 
and more numerous images than others. Existence of a crossing requires that a highway be included 
in the underlying roads dataset, which is primarily based on roads as of 1997.10 Images of the built 
environment were coded between 2000 and 2019, with image quality and coverage improving over 
 
8 United States National Imagery and Mapping Agency.  Documentation and definitions are available at 
at http://www.agiweb.org/pubs/globalgis/metadata_qr/roads_qk_ref.html. 
9 Using latitude/longitude coordinates generated by the overlay exercise, human coders used Google maps, Bing, and 
Yandex to located and code each crossing. We eliminated instances where all assigned coders failed to confirm a 
crossing.  
10 These are an adequate sample since we are not primarily interested in the building of roads, but rather the authoritative 





time. Because of uneven coverage of satellite imagery data (observations are available irregularly, and 
typically not yearly), we forward and backward interpolate the data, assuming that border crossing 
structures present in the first observed year existed prior to that date and continued to exist until 
subsequent observation periods.  
 
 
Perimeters: Walls and Fences 
States have recently started to erect walls at an accelerated rate (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015, 
Carter and Poast 2017, Vallet 2016). The stated justification for building walls is varied, but often 
reflects a desire to directly block unwanted movement across a significant portion of the border region, 
be it the movement of armed forces, migrants, criminal organization, or illicit materials.  The presence 
of walls is typically justified as an attempt to deny illicit forms of entry or exit in the border region, 
instead funneling movement toward legal ports of entry where active filtering can take place.  
We use Carter and Poast’s (2017, 248-250) data to identify continuous border structures 
intended to “prevent entrance by any unwanted entities” (248).  Like the original authors, we refer to 
all structures in this data set as “walls” though it also records structures that are better defined as 
fences and defense lines. In 2014, the most recent year for which these data are available, there were 
45 recorded walls, though recent research suggests this number has increased in recent years.  Given 
right-censoring, we assume any walls present at that time continue to exist.  
Border zones: Police Stations 
Finally, we consider the possibility that police have a role in displays of border control. While 
they are structured differently across countries – some are centrally controlled at the state level, others 





institutions are a “special source of the state’s monopolization of legitimate force on its territory” 
(Reiner 2010). Peter Andreas (2003) has argued persuasively that border security more than ever 
resembles policing. As such, the location of policing investments is highly relevant to border displays. 
Border areas have long been associated with smuggling, trafficking and contraband of 
unwanted goods and people (Dube, Dube, and Garcia-Ponce 2013, Munro 2012). Especially since 
9/11, ordinary police have become increasingly involved with the enforcement of state immigration 
laws, even in states where such responsibilities have traditionally been outside of their job description 
(Wishnie 2003). Police have become central to the institutionalization of cooperative “integrative 
border management” practiced in Europe and elsewhere (Bigo 2014). To the extent that the border is 
viewed as a place where authoritative social control is necessary, police presence at and near the border 
becomes a priority.  
In contrast to border walls and border crossings, investments in policing are made throughout 
national territory, with population centers a likely priority. We therefore measure police presence in 
the border region relative to the interior of a state, weighted by population in each area, using geocoded data 
on police stations world-wide derived from OpenStreetMap (OSM), gathered in July 2020.11  
These data result from voluntary crowdsourcing, but they nevertheless give a general 
indication of where police are located. Importantly, these police data are time invariant and we are 
therefore unable to determine when each police station was built. These data are therefore useful in 
unpacking cross-sectional variance in police presence, but do not contribute to temporal variation in 
the measurement model introduced below.  
To generate a measure of relative police presence, we begin by drawing a 30-kilometer buffer 
zone on each side of all international land borders and record the number of police stations per one 
 





hundred thousand population within this area.  We then compare the density of police stations per 
population within the interior of a country, excluding coastal zones. Relative police presence is 
calculated as: 
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where higher values correspond to disproportionate police presence in border zones relative to the 
interior of a country, controlling for population. In the following section, this measure is divided into 
a five-category index to adjust for its highly skewed distribution. 
 
III.  Measurement and Validation of Border Orientation 
A Latent Model of Border Orientation 
Border crossing infrastructure, border walls, and borderland police presence are all 
manifestations of a state’s underlying border orientation. Latent variable models provide a principled 
means for generating estimates of an unobservable concept based on its observable manifestations 
(Fariss, Kenwick, and Reuning 2019). We construct a Bayesian latent variable model to estimate border 
orientation at particular border crossings, and for contiguous directed dyads (i.e., each side of an 
international border) based on these features. The model assigns higher values to border dyads and 
crossings that contain more infrastructure, according to the indicators outlined above, and lower 
values when little infrastructure is present.  
Because the indicators are measured across differing levels of analysis, we use a hierarchical 
modeling structure. In the equations below, we index each border crossing 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅… ,𝑁𝑁 and each 
directed dyad  𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑… ,𝐷𝐷.12 The manifest variables, or “items” outlined in Table 1 are indexed 𝑗𝑗 =
𝑗𝑗… , 𝐽𝐽 and are observed for either a border crossing 𝑅𝑅 or directed dyad 𝑑𝑑 such that 𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 is the observed 
 





value of indicator 𝑗𝑗 at border crossing 𝑅𝑅 along a directed border dyad, 𝑑𝑑.13 Finally, the specific integer 
values an indicator can take on are denoted 𝑘𝑘 = 1 … ,𝐾𝐾, such that 𝐾𝐾 = 2 for dichotomous indicators, 
𝐾𝐾 > 2 for indicators with more than two categories.  
Our model generates two estimates of border orientation (the latent trait). The first, 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 , is an 
estimate of border orientation at a particular border crossing 𝑅𝑅 along directed dyad 𝑑𝑑, while the second 
𝜉𝜉𝑑𝑑 , is a state’s overall dyadic orientation toward a particular neighbor.  Each of the manifest variables 
is linked to the latent trait through two conditioning parameters: a “discrimination” parameter 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 and 
a “difficulty” parameter 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 . These are analogous to a slope and intercept or cut point parameters in a 
conventional regression setting.  
The manifest indicators and latent trait are linked through an item response theory modeling 
structure, which is composed of a series ordered logistic regression functions.  These reduce to the 
two probability equations below, where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖0 = −∞ and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = ∞ and 𝐹𝐹( ) is the cumulative logistic 
function. Equations 1 and 2 pertain to the probability equations for crossing-level and directed dyad-
level indicators, respectively, as reflected in the absence of the 𝑅𝑅 subscripting in the latter.  
𝑃𝑃�𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘� = 𝐹𝐹�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑� −  𝐹𝐹�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑� (1) 
 𝑃𝑃�𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘� = 𝐹𝐹�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝜉𝜉𝑑𝑑� −  𝐹𝐹�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝜉𝜉𝑑𝑑� (2) 
The likelihood function for our model can be expressed as: 




�𝐹𝐹 �𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦[𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑� − 𝐹𝐹 �𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦[𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]−1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑��
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖
∗







Where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  is a dichotomous indicator that is equal to 1 if indicator 𝑗𝑗 is observed at the border crossing 
level and 0 if it is recorded at the directed dyad level, as is the case for the border wall and police data. 
 
13 With the exception of the police data, which is time invariant, all of our indicators are observed annually 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅… ,𝑇𝑇, 





All latent variable models must impose constraints to resolve problems of location, scale, and 
rotational invariance. The latent trait itself has no natural scale and multiple sets of parameter values 
could fit the observed data equally well. We follow common convention in assigning Bayesian priors 
to provide the model with sufficient identifying information about the distribution of the latent trait.14 
We begin by assigning the following hierarchical prior distributions to the latent trait: 
 
𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑~𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝜉𝜉𝑑𝑑 ,𝜎𝜎)     𝜉𝜉𝑑𝑑~𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(0, 1)     𝜎𝜎~𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑦(0, 2.5)   
The standard normal prior on 𝜉𝜉𝑑𝑑 imposes the assumption that the latent trait is approximately 
normally distributed, with a mean intentionally centered at zero. This resolves the problem of location 
and scale invariance by indicating an arbitrary point at which the latent trait will be centered, as well 
as the overall scale of the distribution. The prior assignments for the item specific parameters are: 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(0, 10)     𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ~ 𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(0, 3)  
The assignment of a strictly positive distribution to the discrimination parameters, 𝛽𝛽, resolves 
rotational invariance and reflects the assumption belief that the presence of physical infrastructure (as 
proxied through our variables) corresponds to higher (rather than lower) values of the latent trait.15 
We estimate the models using RStan, a Bayesian modeling program.16 Sufficient samples were obtained 
after running five parallel chains for 3,000 with the first 1,500 from each discarded as warm-up. Trace-
plots and 𝑅𝑅� statistics were consistent with convergence.  
Mapping Border Orientation Globally 
Figure 3 displays a global map of the 2018 border orientation estimates, netting out two 
potential confounders: wealth, which affects the capacity for displays of control, and geography, which 
 
14 See Fariss, Kenwick, and Reuning 2020, 359-361 for a more complete discussion of identification. 
15 All pairwise correlations among the manifest indicators are positive, suggesting that this assumption is not restrictive.  





affects the need for displays of control. To do this, we simply regressed our border orientation scores 
on logged GDP per capita and average elevation at border crossings and display the resulting 
residuals.17 Figure 3 therefore displays border orientation after adjusting for the influence of geography 
and capacity. Border crossings are displayed as dots, color-coded according to the latent trait estimates 
(𝜃𝜃) averaged across both sides of the border. Average scores of the border dyad latent trait (𝜉𝜉) are 
displayed as lines. Permissive (low) border orientation scores are displayed in green and controlling 
(high) scores are displayed in red.  
The map confirms many intuitions. Within the Schengen area, green borders and crossings 
signal states’ commitments to free internal movement. Evidence of filtering mounts on Schengen’s 
eastern edge. Border crossings in Sub-Saharan Africa are permissive, which cannot be attributed to a 
lack of resources alone, since the residuals have already stripped wealth from the estimates in this map. 
South Africa, however, is notably more controlling. Authoritative display wanes along borders that 
are remote, such as those along the Andes, even after adjusting for altitude.  
Figure 4 displays border orientation over time. Borders in most regions of the world have 
experienced significant increases in official state presence, confirming that globalization coexists with 
hardening borders. The rate of increase has accelerated in recent years, especially in Africa, Asia, and 
the Middle East. In North America, elaborate filtering infrastructure already existed at the outset of 
our temporal domain, though satellite imagery does reveal intensification between 2000 and 2018. 
After splitting our sample among autocracies and democracies in 2000, we find that autocracies are 
increasingly more controlling than democracies. The Schengen zone demonstrates that infrastructural 
cumulation is not inevitable: infrastructure can be ripped away with a major commitment to doing so.  
 
17 These factors explain only about 1% of variation at the crossing level and 4% at the dyadic level, such that our original 






Several steps were taken to validate the measurement model. First, we analyzed model fit through 
posterior predictive checks by comparing observed data with the parameter estimates generated by 
the model.  In every case, the predicted and observed distributions closely accorded with one another, 
providing evidence of strong fit.19   
Second, we assessed our measure’s ability to  distinguish from adjacent, but distinct concepts 
(Adcock and Collier 2001).20 One possibility is that border orientation is the same concept as 
international trade control/facilitation. To evaluate whether this is the case, we calculate each country’s 
mean border orientation score and compare this to the World Bank’s Trade Across Borders Index, 
which is a composite of the time and cost for documentary and border compliance to export and 
import goods.21 These two indicators are only weakly related (𝜌𝜌 = 0.158), suggesting that control 
and efficient handling of trade are not incompatible, but nor are they the same concept.  
Is our model of border orientation simply capturing development? Logged GDP per capita is 
only modestly correlated (𝜌𝜌 = 0.192), as is national material capability (𝜌𝜌 = 0.171). Clearly our 
measure captures something apart from these concepts. Nor is there a convincing overlap between 
border orientation and actual immigration policies. Border orientation is only slightly stronger in states 
with few visa waivers22  but does not vary much across dyads with visa waivers and those without. 
Clearly border orientation is conceptually and operationally distinct from existing concepts and 
policies.  
 
18 This section reports results using our raw, un-residualized version of our measure to allow for closer comparisons to 
wealth and development indicators.  
19 Investigation of item-specific parameters also suggests the border crossing indicators are weighted most heavily in 
determining overall orientation scores.  
20 Appendix A (pg. 3) contains bivariate correlation plots pertaining to each discriminant validity check in this section.  
21 The World Bank, Doing Business: Trade Across Borders. Available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders. (Accessed 15 August 2018.) 





V. What Explains States’ Border Orientation? 
Border orientation is a paradigm-shifting concept that facilitates systematic investigation of a 
broad range of border anxieties in domestic and international politics. Territorial claims and conflicts 
are not the only source of border insecurity; indeed, this source of insecurity may in fact be on the 
decline as norms about territorial integrity have strengthened. To state the obvious, the southern U.S. 
border is among the most controlled in the world, but can hardly be understood by territorial disputes 
or claims with Mexico. Border insecurities are often unrelated to traditional interstate territorial 
disputes. We hypothesize that border orientation is driven at least in part by perceived external threats 
to the social and economic life of “the nation.” What is at stake may not be traditional territorial 
integrity (Zacher 2001), but rather economic and even ontological security: domestic groups’ identity 
as productive and successful members of their cultural and national community.  
In this section, we do not aspire to test a fully elaborated causal theory of border orientation, 
but we do illustrate its potential for understanding contemporary politics with a disciplined 
investigation of three overlapping threat vectors: cultural threats, economic threats, and traditional security 
threats. Table 2 presents an analysis of how each relates to border orientation, measured at the directed 
dyad year.23 To account for temporal non-independence, we report results of Prais-Winsten regression 
models, which assume a first-order autoregressive pattern in errors. Models 4 and 5 are run on limited 
samples due to the inclusion of covariates with sparse coverage.  
Border insecurities appear to go well beyond those investigated in existing international 
relations research. Cultural identities exert strong boundary-reinforcing influences in almost all model 
specifications. Culturally homogeneous countries – those with fewer religious, language and ethnic 
divisions (Alesina et al. 2003) – typically establish a more controlling orientation than those with more 
 





heterogeneous populations. This points to the possibility that cultural similarity is prized, while 
signaling that cultural others may be filtered at the border. The models also track the proportion of a 
country’s population that is foreign born,24 and whether this proportion is increasing, although these 
factors are not statistically significant. However, in Appendix C (pg. 7-11) we show that increases in 
foreign born populations exerts an increasingly strong, positive association in more recent years.  
Culturally influenced bordering is evidenced by neighbors’ religious differentiation as well, 
although bordering is more intense within, rather than between, major religions. Two religious 
(dis)similarity measures are included using the Correlates of War religion data (Maoz and Henderson 
2013). Both are related to the largest religious group on each side of a border. “Primary” religious 
affiliations include Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, syncretic beliefs, and animism. 
The “secondary” level further subdivides Christianity (protestant, Catholic, orthodox, Anglican), 
Judaism (orthodox, conservative, reform), and Islam (Shia, Sunni). Intriguingly, the secondary level 
matters most: countries that share the same primary religion (e.g. Christianity) but have a different 
secondary religion (e.g. Catholicism vs. Protestantism) tend to erect more at their borders, while dyads 
with differences at both levels are no more or less likely to hold controlling orientations than religiously 
similar dyads.25  In other words, it is not always “clashes” among the world’s primary religions 
(Huntington 2000) that drive border hardening, but narrower differences within the major religions. 
Iran’s borders provide a good example. Border violence including eight years of war with its Sunni 
neighbor, Iraq, has led to strong fortification along these countries’ shared frontier. By comparison 
Iran’s border with Eastern Orthodox Christian Armenia suggests little intent to filter. The border 
 
24 Data from the United Nations (2017) are recorded every five years, 1990-2015, and for 2017. We interpolate data 
between observation periods and calculate change accordingly. 
25 The reference category for all regressions includes countries whose largest religious group is the same at both the 
primary and secondary level, as well as a small number of observations (0.72%) where countries have the same 





between Catholic Republic of Ireland and Protestant Northern Ireland (UK) is an open exception and 
is maintained as such with conscious effort.  
Economic disparities likely generate border anxieties as well. Wealth differentials consistently 
matter: the larger the wealth gap between a state and its neighbor, the higher our measure of border 
orientation. The mechanism could involve concerns about inflows of low wage workers and low-cost 
goods from a neighboring state stoking domestic political pressures for border control. General state-
wide measures of economic, political or social globalization26 also exert a negative influence border 
orientation. This link between globalization and opened borders may be precisely what has led to some 
notable instances of backlash, with nationalists in otherwise globalized states attempting to reassert 
sovereignty in the border region. 
To be sure, border orientation has some traditional security explanations as well. Border 
displays are indeed heavier along the borders of states that historically have had militarized conflicts, 
as measured by the number of militarized interstate disputes between neighboring states, 1946-1999 
(Palmer et al. 2015, Maoz et al. ). The military ceremonies held by India and Pakistan at the Wagah-Attari 
crossing is emblematic of this interplay between interstate rivalry and border politics. Western 
Europe’s experience demonstrates that the consequences of past conflict are neither inevitable nor 
irreversible. Second, terrorist attacks, defined as instances where non-state actors threaten or use 
violence against civilians to intimidate or coerce for political, religious, or economic ends,27 are 
correlated with more controlling border orientations.28 By contrast, we found a negative relationship 
 
26 These are de facto measures based on economic, political, cultural and interpersonal sub-indicators. For details see 
Gygli et al (2019). The economic indicator weights trade and financial integration most heavily. Data available at 
https://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html.  
27 Measured as a count of terrorist attacks within a state’s territory within the past five years National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2018). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved 
from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd,  
28 Previous studies have found a similar, positive link between terrorism and the construction of border walls and fences 






between past civil conflict in a neighboring state29 and controlling border orientations. We suspect 
that this result is driven by capacity, as less developed states are likely to share borders with conflict-
prone neighbors yet lack the capacity to project their presence. 
One important finding is a null result: there is little evidence that the traditional conception of 
borders as territorial divisions explains modern border orientation. There is no direct evidence that 
the presence of an unsettled or conflicting territorial claim between neighbors significantly impacts 
border orientation.30 These data are limited to three years’ worth of observations, which is why we 
only include the variable in model 4, but the null finding suggests that the usual way of thinking about 
borders as territorial divisions that are inherently disputatious and potentially threaten state security, 
are not in fact the central condition associated with investments in the symbols and structures of 
modern border security.  
If modern border orientation cannot be fully explained by traditional state security concerns 
or staking out claims to territory under interstate dispute, we need an innovative explanation for the 
trends described with this new data. The cultural and economic findings above suggest broad political 
movements and ideologies of “othering” contribute to domestic demands for border control.  As an 
additional plausibility probe, we explore the relationship between border orientation one measure of 
populism. While populism has many contextualized meanings, we test for a conception of populism 
that represents a “thin” ideology, that distinguishes two homogenous and antagonistic groups: a 
“corrupt elite” and a “pure people” (Mudde 2017). It “presupposes that the elite comes from the same 
 
cases terrorists enter a country at official crossings rather than overland, our more granular measure may provide a more 
precise test of this link in future research.  
29 Dichotomous variable for whether the neighboring state is experiencing a civil conflict resulting in at least 25 fatalities 
in the preceding two decades. Armed Conflict Data (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017). 
30 Data obtained from Frederick, Hensel, and Macaulay (2017). Given the short temporal domain and high degree of 
autocorrelation, we also supplemented this model with cross-sectional variants, finding no substantive changes in the 





group as the people, but have willingly chosen to betray them, by putting the special interests and 
inauthentic morals of the elite over those of the people” (Mudde 2017) The “pure people” is a term 
that is often racially and nationally exclusive. Rodrik (2018) relates the rise of populism to specific 
global economic shocks: populists from the left are often concerned with combatting threats from 
trade and investment, while those on the right are often concerned with immigration and refugees. 
Human mobility, cultural difference and economic integration have arguably sharpened cleavages that 
make populist ideas increasingly salient. We hypothesize that both functional and symbolic border 
displays are increasingly attractive under these circumstances.  
Model 5 includes the average level of populist rhetoric employed in speeches by presidents 
and prime ministers using the text-based measure computed by Hawkins et al. (2019). These data are 
currently available for only 40 countries, including most of the larger countries of Europe, some of 
the Americas, India and Turkey. Border orientation is not a characteristic of a single political leader, 
but since the sample for which data are available is fairly democratic, this measure likely reflects broad 
political currents that have at least some appeal nationally. We take the average score across the entire 
observation period of 1998-2019 to gain a holistic picture of a given state. The populist rhetoric of 
leaders is indeed correlated with a state’s border orientation in the expected direction. Figure 5 
demonstrates a robust bivariate correlation between populism and border orientation, consistent with 
our conjecture that physical displays at the border reflect anxieties about globalization and cultural 
Others, at least for a subset of states for whom data are available.   
Control variables in Table 2 behave as we would expect. As discussed above, GDP per capita 
explains a relatively small proportion of the variation in border orientation but nevertheless remains 
positive and significant across all specifications.31 In addition, every model shows that states within the 
 





Schengen zone have relatively low scores, suggesting that border commitments are reversible through 
institutional arrangements. Though democracies may tend to have more permissive border 
orientations, this coefficient is neither negative nor significant in most specifications.32 A country’s 
border orientation is strongly correlated with that of its neighbor, though several mechanisms could 
produce this result – competition, emulation, or simply geographic clustering of omitted variables. 
The average elevation at a country’s border crossings has a negative, albeit insignificant coefficient, 
probably explained by a lower demand for movement and higher costs of infrastructural development. 
VI. Conclusion 
Borders are crucial institutions in international and domestic politics. They are important sites 
of governance and have come to define what it means to be a modern state. International borders 
have at least as much salience domestically as they do internationally. They delineate the space over 
which states have jurisdiction; they also delineate the people for whom national public goods – from 
security to social services to stable political institutions – are to be provided (Goemans 2006). They 
may even shape the fundamental identity of a people by distinguishing the national from the 
transnational and the foreign.  
All of these possibilities require a much richer understanding of the functions and meaning of 
international borders than has been typical in political science. Surprisingly little systematic 
investigation has been made into governments’ fundamental orientation toward displays of border 
control. We suggest that the spatial orientation of governance – how starkly a polity signals control 
over filtering “us” from “them” – is as important as many of its other governing qualities, such as 
bureaucratic/administrative competence, civil-military relations, and state/society relations. While 
interstate territorial conflicts are among the most intractable a state may face, our findings suggest that 
 
32 Measured using the 21-point Polity2 index (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2017). In cross-sectional regressions this 





modern border politics has less to do with traditional territorial integrity (Zacher 2001), and more to 
do with perceptions of non-state threats to national sovereignty.  
How might the concept of border orientation inform future research? One research agenda 
should focus on elaborating explanations for border orientation itself. We have focused here on land 
borders, and controlled for mountains, but further investigation may reveal distinctive geographical 
features, such as long coastlines, rivers or expansive deserts that might influence border orientation. 
Additionally, historical context should be more fully explored (Abramson and Carter 2016, Maier 
2016, Gavrilis 2008). Historical rivalries, trade routes, imperial and national strategies of expansion 
and development, and long-established patterns of human settlement likely influence state displays at 
the border. Much more should be done to understand modern trends as well. If border orientation 
really is connected in some way to perceived threats of globalization, research should explore the 
mechanisms through which integrative pressures are translated into preferences and ultimately policy 
regarding the spatial orientation of state displays of authority.  
It may be that border orientation is less about economics and more about various threats to 
individual or group identity. The two may of course be related, since one important source of identity 
is employment and occupational status (Carper 2017). Cultural identity, cultural threats, and “we” 
versus “them” ideologies such as populism, should be explored in greater depth and with multiple 
methods. The association between surges in foreign-born residents and border thickening should be 
further tested and probed for the direction of causation, if any.33 We suspect cultural explanations 
would be enriched by theories of distributive politics, with dominant groups who are gradually losing 
economic and cultural privileges making the loudest demands for displays of border control.  
 





The richest payoff to studying border orientation will be to understand its consequences. Note 
that border orientation is a commitment to display authority; effectiveness (which would need to be 
carefully defined and measured) is not assumed. For policy relevance, it will be important to know 
whether attention to border control pays dividends – that is, whether it achieves some (un)articulated 
goal. Does a commitment to filter at the border reduce crime, illicit trafficking, and terrorism (Avdan 
and Gelpi 2016)? Affect trade (Carter and Poast 2020)? Reduce unauthorized inward migration (Allen, 
Dobbin, and Morten 2018)? Does a stringent border orientation have unintended consequences – 
send hostile signals to neighbors? Stoke nationalism? Divert rather than reduce transnational crime 
(Getmanski, Grossman, and Wright 2019)? Encourage delay of costly internal measures in the face of 
transnational pandemics (Kenwick and Simmons 2020)? Or is it the case that the impact of these 
investments is largely in the eyes of the beholder, enhancing a sense of psychological, rather than 
material security? By developing the concept of border orientation at the level of the nation-state, 
border dyads, and even border crossings and segments, there is now a way to investigate variance on 







Abramson, Scott F, and David B Carter. 2016. "The historical origins of territorial disputes."  American 
Political Science Review 110 (4):675-698. 
Adcock, Robert, and David Collier. 2001. "Measurement validity: A shared standard for qualitative and 
quantitative research."  American Political Science Review 95 (3):529-546. 
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. 
"Fractionalization."  Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2):155-194. 
Allansson, Marie, Erik Melander, and Lotta Themnér. 2017. "Organized violence, 1989–2016."  Journal of 
Peace Research 54 (4):574-587. 
Allee, Todd L., and Paul K. Huth. 2006. "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as 
Domestic Political Cover."  American Political Science Review 100 (02):219-234. 
Allen, Treb, Cauê de Castro Dobbin, and Melanie Morten. 2018. Border walls. National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Andreas, Peter. 2003. "Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-first Century."  
International Security 28 (2):78-111. 
Andreas, Peter, and Thomas J Biersteker. 2014. The rebordering of North America: integration and 
exclusion in a new security context: Routledge. 
Atzili, Boaz, and Burak Kadercan. 2017. "Territorial designs and international politics: the diverging 
constitution of space and boundaries."  Territory, Politics, Governance 5 (2):115-130. 
Avdan, Nazli. 2018. Visas and Walls: Border Security in the Age of Terrorism: University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
Avdan, Nazli, and Christopher F Gelpi. 2016. "Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Border Barriers 
and the Transnational Flow of Terrorist Violence."  International Studies Quarterly 61 (1):14-27. 
Baud, Michiel, and Willem Van Schendel. 1997. "Toward a comparative history of borderlands."  Journal 
of World History 8 (2):211-242. 
Baudet, Thierry. 2012. The significance of borders: why representative government and the rule of law 
require nation states: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Bigo, Didier. 2014. "The (in) securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control: 
Military/Navy–border guards/police–database analysts."  Security Dialogue 45 (3):209-225. 
Boone, Catherine. 2003. Political topographies of the African state: Territorial authority and institutional 
choice: Cambridge University Press. 
Brown, Wendy. 2010. Walled states, waning sovereignty. New York Zone Books. 
Buchanan, Allen, and Margaret Moore. 2003. "Introduction: The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries." 
In States, nations and borders: the ethics of making boundaries, edited by Allen Buchanan and 
Margaret Moore, 1-15. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Carper, James. 2017. "The elements of identification with an occupation." In Sociological work, 177-188. 
Routledge. 
Carter, David B, and Paul Poast. 2017. "Why do states build walls? Political economy, security, and 
border stability."  Journal of Conflict Resolution 61 (2):239-270. 
Carter, David B, and Paul Poast. 2020. "Barriers to Trade: How Border Walls Affect Trade Relations."  
International Organization 74 (1):165-185. 
Castells, Manuel. 2000. The rise of the network society. 2nd ed. ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Caughey, Devin, and Christopher Warshaw. 2016. "The dynamics of state policy liberalism, 1936–2014."  
American Journal of Political Science 60 (4):899-913. 
Chalfin, Brenda. 2010. Neoliberal frontiers : an ethnography of sovereignty in West Africa. Chicago: The 





Diener, Alexander C. 2012. Borders : a very short introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dube, Arindrajit, Oeindrila Dube, and Omar Garcia-Ponce. 2013. "Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws 
and Violence in Mexico."  American Political Science Review 107 (03):397-417. 
Fariss, Christopher J, Michael R Kenwick, and Kevin Reuning. 2019. "Measurement models." In SAGE 
Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations, edited by Luigi 
Curini and Robert Jr Franzese. 
Frederick, Bryan A, Paul R Hensel, and Christopher Macaulay. 2017. "The Issue Correlates of War 
Territorial Claims Data, 1816–20011."  Journal of Peace Research 54 (1):99-108. 
Fromm, Erich. 2013. Man for himself: An inquiry into the psychology of ethics: Routledge. 
Gavrilis, George. 2008. The dynamics of interstate boundaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Getmanski, Anne, Guy Grossman, and Austin L Wright. 2019. "Border walls and smuggling spillovers."  
Quarterly Journal of Political Science 14 (3):329-347. 
Goemans, H. E. 2006. "Bounded Communities: Territorial Changes and International Conflict." In 
Territoriality and conflict in an era of globalization, edited by Miles Kahler and Barbara F. Walter. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Goff, Patricia M. 2000. "Invisible borders: Economic liberalization and national identity."  International 
Studies Quarterly 44 (4):533-562. 
Goodman, Seymour E., and Michael Portnoy. 2009. Global initiatives to secure cyberspace : an emerging 
landscape, Advances in information security ; 42. New York: Springer. 
Gygli, Savina, Florian Haelg, Niklas Potrafke, and Jan-Egbert Sturm. 2019. "The KOF Globalisation Index – 
revisited."  The Review of International Organizations 14 (3):543-574. 
Hassner, Ron E., and Jason Wittenberg. 2015. "Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and 
Why?"  International Security 40 (1):157-190. 
Hawkins, Kirk A, Rosario  Aguilar, Erin  Jenne, Bojana   Kocijan, Cristóbal  Rovira Kaltwasser, and Bruno 
Castanho Silva. 2019. Global Populism Database: Populism Dataset for Leaders. 
Herz, John H. 1957. "Rise and demise of the territorial state."  World Politics 9 (4):473-493. 
Herzog, Lawrence A. 2014. "Globalisation, Place and Twenty-First-Century International Border Regions: 
An Introduction to the Special Issue."  Global Society 28 (4):391-397. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 2000. "The clash of civilizations?" In Culture and politics, 99-118. Springer. 
Hurley, Robert F, and G Tomas M Hult. 1998. "Innovation, market orientation, and organizational 
learning: an integration and empirical examination."  Journal of marketing 62 (3):42-54. 
Jackman, Simon. 2009. Bayesian analysis for the social sciences. Vol. 846: John Wiley & Sons. 
Kenwick, Michael R., and Beth A. Simmons. 2020. “Pandemic Response as Border Politics.” International 
Organization 74(Suppl.): 1–23 
Longo, Matthew. 2017a. "From Sovereignty to Imperium: Borders, Frontiers and the Specter of Neo-
Imperialism."  Geopolitics 22 (4):757-771. 
Longo, Matthew. 2017b. The politics of borders: sovereignty, security, and the citizen after 9/11: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lumpkin, G Tom, and Gregory G Dess. 1996. "Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation construct and 
linking it to performance."  Academy of Management Review 21 (1):135-172. 
Maier, Charles S. 2016. Once Within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth, and Belonging Since 1500. 
Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Maoz, Zeev, Paul L. Johnson, Jasper Kaplan, Fiona Ogunkoya and Aaron Shreve. 2018. “The Dyadic 
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, Charictaristics, and 
Comparisons to Alternate Datasets. Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (3): 811-835.  
Maoz, Zeev, and Errol A Henderson. 2013. "The world religion dataset, 1945–2010: Logic, estimates, and 





Marshall, Monty, Ted Robert  Gurr, and Keith  Jaggers. 2017. Data Users’ Manual, Polity IV Project: 
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016. Available online at: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2016.pdf. 
Martin, Craig. 2012. "Desperate Mobilities: Logistics, Security and the Extra-Logistical Knowledge of 
‘Appropriation’."  Geopolitics 17 (2):355-376. 
Mitzen, Jennifer. 2006. "Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the security dilemma."  
European Journal of International Relations 12 (3):341-370. 
Mudde, Cas. 2017. "An ideational approach."  The Oxford Handbook of Populism:27-47. 
Mukerji, Chandra. 2010. "The territorial state as a figured world of power: Strategics, logistics, and 
impersonal rule."  Sociological Theory 28 (4):402-424. 
Munro, Peter. 2012. "Harbouring the illicit: borderlands and human trafficking in South East Asia."  
Crime, Law and Social Change 58 (2):159-177. 
Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. The Borderless World: Power and Strategies in the Interlinked Economy. New 
York: Harper Business. 
Palmer, Glenn, Vito d’Orazio, Michael Kenwick, and Matthew Lane. 2015. "The MID4 dataset, 2002–
2010: Procedures, coding rules and description."  Conflict Management and Peace Science 32 
(2):222-242. 
Pelkmans, Mathijs. 2006. Defending the border: identity, religion, and modernity in the Republic of 
Georgia: Cornell University Press. 
Poole, Keith T, and Howard Rosenthal. 2000. Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting: 
Oxford University Press on Demand. 
Reiner, Robert. 2010. The politics of the police: Oxford University Press. 
Rodrik, Dani. 2018. "Populism and the Economics of Globalization."  Journal of International Business 
Policy:1-22. 
Rudolph, Christopher. 2005. "Sovereignty and territorial borders in a global age."  International studies 
review 7 (1):1-20. 
Rumford, Chris. 2006. "Rethinking European spaces: territory, borders, governance."  Comparative 
European Politics 4:127-140. 
Sahlins, Peter. 1989. Boundaries : the making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
Sassen, Saskia. 2008. "Bordering capabilities versus borders: implications for national borders."  Mich. J. 
Int'l L. 30:567. 
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2015. "Borders, conflict, and trade."  Annual Review of Political Science 18:125-145. 
Senese, Paul D, and John A Vasquez. 2008. The steps to war: An empirical study: Princeton University 
Press. 
Simmons, Beth A. 2019. "Border Rules."  International Studies Review 21 (2):256-283. 
Steinberg, Jessica. 2017. "'Strong’ States and Strategic Governance: A model of territorial variation in 
state presence."  Journal of Theoretical Politics 30 (2):224-245. 
UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2017. Trends in International 
Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revision. Geneva: United Nations database. 
Vallet, Élisabeth. 2016. Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity? New York: Routledge. 
VandeWalle, Don. 1997. "Development and validation of a work domain goal orientation instrument."  
Educational and Psychological Measurement 57 (6):995-1015. 
Weber, Max. 1919. "Politics as a Vocation, 1918."  From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: 
Galaxy Books, 1958):77-128. 
Wilson, Thomas M., and Hastings Donnan, eds. 1998. Border identities : nation and state at international 





Wishnie, Michael J. 2003. "State and local police enforcement of immigration laws."  U. Pa. J. Const. L. 
6:1084. 
Zacher, Mark. 2001. "The territorial integrity norm: International boundaries and the use of force."  








Table 1: Border Crossing Features Collected as Part of Data Collection Effort 
Border Crossing Features Description 
(1) Official building(s) Codes whether and how many buildings are near the 
border that appear to be “official,” meaning a state-
controlled border security facility. 
(2) Gate or barricade Gates, barriers, or structures that straddle the main road 
that itself crosses the international border. Includes 
partial structures that appear designed to slow, divert, 
inspect, identify or stop traffic.  
(3) Split lanes Identifies any change in the roadway to accommodate 
search, interdiction, inspection, or pullover areas.  
Border Zone Features Description 
(1) Border Wall/Fence Man-made structures erected across interstate borders 
with the intention of denying entry of unwanted materials 
or personnel, recorded at the directed interstate dyad 
(Carter and Post 2015).  
(2) Relative Police Station Density Location of police stations were obtained from 
OpenStreetMap. Police density is calculated as the 
proportion of police stations in border region relative to 
the interior, both weighted by population.  













Figure 1: Border orientation is an unobservable state commitment to the authoritative display of control over the terms of 






a. United States and Mexico (Latitude: 27.502377, Longitude: -99.502641) 
 
b. Burkina Faso and Togo (Latitude: 10.977377, Longitude: 0.511543) 
                  
Figure 2: Images on which Border Orientation Indicators are based; "Thick" and "Thin" state presence at border crossings. 








Figure 3: Border Orientation at the Level of the Border Crossing and Border Pair. Border crossings are displayed as points and border dyads are displayed as 
lines, scored after being residualized on a regression of GDP per capita and average elevation. Results are averaged across each side of the border. Green corresponds to permissive 







Figure 4: Border Orientation Across Time.  Mean border orientation score by regime type, region, Schengen Zone status, 








Figure 5: Populism and Border Orientation. Note the bivariate regression line in red. Border orientation is country-
wide mean score for the period 2000-2018. 
 
